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We use an equilibrium search framework to model a formal-informal sector labour 
market where the informal sector arises endogenously.  In our model large firms will 
be in the formal sector and pay a wage premium, while small firms are characterised 
by low wages and tend to be in the informal sector. Using data from the South African 
labour force survey we illustrate that the data is consistent with these predictions.   
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Section I: Introduction 
One of the main differences between labour markets in developing compared 
to developed economies is the existence of large informal sectors.  For example, in 
Africa the informal sector is estimated to absorb about 60 per cent of the urban labour 
force.
2  Importantly in this regard, it is generally assumed, and empirically 
substantiated by much of the literature
3, that workers in the informal sector are paid 
less than their formal sector counterparts.  However, theoretically it is not clear why 
this should be the case.  While a tax wedge would explain differences in gross wages, 
if workers can move between sectors then net wages should surely be equalised.  
Earlier papers in the literature such as Lewis (1954) or Harris and Todaro (1970) 
assumed a dual labour market structure where workers earned rents in the primary 
sector and secondary sector workers queued for good jobs.  There are of course many 
models that could be used to justify why workers in particular sectors would earn 
wage premiums – as, for example, efficiency wage
4 and union models – but applying 
these to explain a wage premium for formal sector employees would mean arbitrarily 
assuming that formal sector workers earn rents because of some exogenously imposed 
feature that for some reason is more relevant to the formal rather than the informal 
sector.   
In this paper we use an equilibrium search framework, which is a modified 
version of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), to model the formal/informal sector labour 
market where the informal sector emerges endogenously.
 5  More specifically, firms 
                                                 
2 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/informal/who.htm 
3 See, for example, Mazumdar (1981), Heckman and Hotz (1986), Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), 
Tansel (1999), and Gong and Van Soest (2002). 
4 Jones (1983) uses the shirking efficiency wage model to characterise the formal sector in a model 
with minimum wages 
5 Burdett and Mortensen (1998) outline the equilibrium search framework that has become increasingly 
popular and can be seen as providing a basis for modern monopsony models of the labour market [see 
Manning (2003)].     3 
post wages and workers may work in the formal sector or may opt for a tax free 
outside option, which could be viewed as informal sector self-employment, as 
discussed and modelled by Albrecht et al. (2005).  We find that in this set-up formal 
sector employees do indeed earn rents relative to their informal counterparts in the 
model.  However, this is not because they are formal sector employees, but because in 
our model large firms will pay higher wages and have the incentive to stay in the 
formal sector.  Intuitively it arguably makes sense that small firms would be the most 
difficult for the government to find and the most likely to stay in the informal sector.  
Indeed, a number of theoretical models [Fortin et al. (1997) and Rauch (1991), for 
example] impose this assumption. Moreover, many empirical studies seem to confirm 
that informal sector workers are concentrated in small firms.
6  As a matter of fact, 
small enterprise size is part of the ILO definition of the informal sector and has been 
used in a number of papers as a proxy for such. 
A search model where it is difficult for workers and firms to find each other 
seems like a natural way to model the labour market with an informal sector in 
developing countries, where it is often argued that there are no clear channels for the 
exchange of labour market information.
7  There are other papers in the literature that 
have used a search-matching framework to model the informal labour market.  For 
example, Albrecht et al (2005) extend the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching 
model to incorporate a self-employed informal sector where there is heterogeneity in 
workers’ productivity in that more productive workers may opt to wait for a formal 
sector job, while others may select into the informal sector.  Also, Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2005) develop a matching model  with supervision where workers in the informal 
sector cannot avail of unemployment benefit, and show that matches found not paying 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Tybout (2000). 
7 See, for example, Hussmanns (1994) or Byrne and Strobl (2004) .   4 
tax are dissolved.    Their model suggests that policies aimed at reducing the size of 
the shadow economy may increase unemployment.  Alternatively, Fugazza and 
Jacques (2001) incorporate psychic costs as part of the costs of being in the informal 
economy in a matching model where workers direct their search at informal sector 
firms. However, it is important to emphasize that while the papers using the matching 
framework just noted focus on exogenously given worker heterogeneity.  In the 
equilibrium search framework we adopt in this paper the informal sector emerges 
endogenously without arbitrarily imposing any differences in the two sectors other 
than that larger firms are more likely to be caught defaulting on their tax.
8 
A key prediction of our equilibrium search framework is that large firms pay 
more even when there is no heterogeneity amongst either workers or firms ex ante. It 
is only in the case where there are no search frictions that the labour market is 
competitive and the formal/large firm size premium disappears.  There is already some 
evidence that suggests that firm size may be a driving factor behind the often observed 
formal sector wage premium.  For example, Pratap and Quintin (2005) find, using 
Argentinean data and semi-parametric techniques to deal with the selectivity issue 
inherent in estimating the possibility of a formal sector wage premium, that there is no 
difference in gross wages between informal workers and their formal sector 
counterparts and that the employer’s size is crucial in making the wage premium 
‘disappear’
9.  Using a similar econometric techniques and rich South African data that 
allows a relatively precise measure of informal employment we confirm that firm size 
                                                 
8 In our paper we interpret informality to mean tax avoidance rather than just any illegal activity.  
Schneider and Enste (2000) provide a survey of the general literature on shadow economies and its 
various definitions. 
9 Amaral and Quintin (2006) outline a theoretical framework where the only difference between 
informal and formal sector firms is that informal sector firms are seen as more likely to default on 
loans, have difficulty accessing credit and because of this, rely on self financing.  Because of the 
complementarity between skill and capital, high skill capital intensive firms enter the formal sector and 
hire high skill workers.  Thus in contrast to our model labour markets are competitive and wage 
differentials can be explained by differences in ability.     5 
can explain away the formal sector wage premium, but only if one assumes, as appears 
reasonable, that informal sector workers do not pay taxes, as is assumed in our model.  
One should note that while our equilibrium search model generates predictions 
that are in line with the empirical evidence - small low wage informal firms and large 
high wage formal firms - the model admittedly imposes a lot of structure. An obvious 
drawback is that if the structure we impose is incorrect one must worry that it may be 
driving the results.  An advantage of this framework  is, however, that  we have a 
model that allows us to do comparative static analysis on the policy parameters and 
predict the long run change in the equilibrium wage distribution accounting for firm 
entry and exit.  Given the amount of structure on the model though, it seems more 
reasonable to interpret the comparative static results as plausible examples rather than 
general results.  Some of the comparative static results are surprising.  In particular, 
we find that in the long run when we account for the impact of firm exit on the shape 
of the distribution, an increase in the tax rate may reduce the share of the informal 
sector for plausible parameter values.  An increase in the enforcement/punishment 
parameter tends to reduce the share of the informal sector as one would expect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
present our model.  In Section II we describe our data.  Empirical evidence in support 
of results derived from our model are shown in Section III.  Concluding remarks are 
given in the final section.  
 
Section II: The Model 
II.1 The Basic Set-Up 
There is a mass of M identical employers and a mass L of identical workers in 
the economy.  We normalise L to unity.  The non-employment outside option is b and   6 
employed workers have fixed productivity  p.
10  There is random matching so that 
workers receive  l  offers at each instant and any offer is equally likely to come from 
any firm irrespective of the firm’s size
11. l is a Poisson arrival rate.  The distribution 
of wage offers which we will solve for is F(w).  Burdett and Mortensen (1998) derive 
the labour supply curve for individual firms.  When we assume the arrival rate of job 
offers is same for employed and unemployed workers this is
12: 
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Using this expression for labour supply the profit of a firm is: 
2 )]} ( 1 [ {
) (
) )( , ( ) , (
w F M
w p






p           (2) 
Given that employed and unemployed workers have the same arrival rate of job offers 
the reservation wage is just the benefit level  b.  The employment levels of firms 
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There is free entry and firms continue to enter until the expected flow of future profits 
equals entry costs.  This implies that all firms make equal profits.  In particular if 
fixed entry costs are k, we equate profits of reservation wage firms with firms paying 
any other wage  k F b n b p F b F w n w p F w d p p = - = = - = ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , (  and solve 
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10 Traditionally this outside option b is viewed as unemployment benefits.  In the context of developing 
countries it is perhaps more appropriately seen as self-employment or support for the non-employed by 
their family which is a relatively common feature of the developing world. 
11 See Manning (2003) pp284-286 for a discussion on the matching technology. 
12 We note here that the labour supply curve in Burdett and Mortensen allows for different arrival rates 
for unemployed (? 0) and employed (? 1) workers.  The labour supply curve in this case, not  normalising 
the mass of workers L to unity is:  ] ) ( [




















= .  That is it 
is just the labour supply curve in (2) (with ? replaced by ?1) times a constant.   7 




II.2 A Tax on Wage Income. 
   Here we modify the Burdett and Mortensen model by introducing a tax rate t 
on wage income that is paid by firms.  Labour supply is still given by (1) once we 
solve for the wage distribution.  There will be a Poisson arrival rate of tax inspectors, 
which is increasing in the size of the firm:  zn (w)
 b.  We specify the penalty for 
defaulting as x times the firms per period tax bill wtn(w).  To save on notation we 
define s=xz as the parameter that determines the level of enforcement/punishment for 
defaulters and s=b+1.  The flow values of defaulting (d) and complying (c) firms in a 
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The flow value of the firm where r is the discount  rate is the dividend stream (flow of 
profits) plus any capital gain/loss terms.  The flow of profits for defaulting firms is 
) ( ) ( w n w p
d - = p and for complying firms:  ) ( )] 1 ( [ w n t w p
c + - = p .  Defaulting firms 
have a higher flow of profits than compliers at a given wage but, in addition to the 
exogenous arrival rate of negative shocks that close the firm d defaulting firms receive 
an expected flow of punishment swtn(w)
s  at each point in time.  We note that the two 
policy instruments the government has are the tax rate  t and the degree of 
punishment/enforcement s.  Burdett and Mortensen (1998) assume  r=0 in their 
                                                 
13 If we use the expression for k given above we get the formulation given in Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998): 












l d .   8 
derivation of the labour supply curve (1) and we also make this assumption. From (5) 
the value of defaulting and compliant firms respectively are:  
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Free entry ensures that these hold in equilibrium.  Using (3) in (6) one can solve for 
this in terms of the reservation wage and get the equilibrium value of a firm in terms 
of the exogenous parameters.  Comparing (6) and (7) it is straightforward to show 
that: 
c d V V >   if 
1 1 - >
s n
s
  and 
c d V V <   if 
1 1 - <
s n
s
  (8) 
That is there is a critical level of employment n
s-1 below which firms can always do 
better in the informal sector.  We can use the expression for labour supply (1) in (8) to 
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Free entry ensures that V
d=V
c=k.  Imposing this free entry condition using (6) and (7) 
for the value of firms and  (1) for labour supply we can calculate the relationship 
between the wage and offer distribution for defaulting and compliant firms: 
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14 It is worth noting from (6) that even with a general production function y=y(n) ,where y is out put, 
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The wage in the lowest wage firm is b and since all other firms pay higher 
wages the value of the wage offer distribution will be zero at a wage b. Using w=b 
and F=0 in (6) and setting the value of the lowest wage firm equal to entry costs k we 
can solve for the relationship between entry costs and the mass of firms in terms of 
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In Figure 1 we graphically depict the inverse wage offer distribution of our model for 
two different tax rates, 10% and 30%, using (10) for values of F between zero and F* 
and (11) for values of F between F* and unity under assumed values for the 
exogenous parameters.  The graph illustrates a wage  offer distribution which is 
consistent with the stylised facts.  Small low wage firms are in the informal sector and 
large high wage firms in the formal sector.  While we will do some comparative static 
analysis later where both arrival rates of job offers ( l) and entry costs (k) are 
dependent on the mass of firms in equilibrium, Figure 1 plots the response to a tax 
change under the simpler assumption that these parameters are fixed when the mass of 
firms changes in accordance with (12).  The wage distribution becomes more 
compressed in response to the higher tax rate as we would expect.  Firms paying high 
wages must adjust there wage downwards in response to the tax, while the lowest 
wage firms are already paying the reservation wage and cannot lower the wage any 
further.  
   10 
II.3 Endogenous Productivity 
The basic Burdett and Mortensen model with homogeneous productivity 
across firms predicts a wage distribution with a lot of weight on the upper tail of the 
distribution whereas empirically it has been observed that the wage distribution 
generally has a long right hand tail. Mortensen (2003) discusses this issue and outlines  
a number of generalisations to the basic Burdett and Mortensen model where 
productivity varies across firms.  These generalisations generate wage distributions 
that are more in keeping with empirically observed wage distributions.  This can be 
where there is exogenous variation in firms’ productivity and firms can choose the 
number of contacts with workers, or, alternatively, where firms may be allowed to 
invest in costly match specific or general capital, which generates differences in 
productivity.  We will take the case where firms invest in match specific capital and 
apply our model of the informal sector to this set-up.   
Within this framework we look at the model analysed earlier where the risk of 
detection for defaulters rises with firm size so that small low wage firms are in the 
informal sector.  We will set up the profit function in general terms before 
distinguishing between the defaulting and compliant sectors.  We assume that 
] , [ c d j ˛  so that  wj=w when j=d and wj=w(1+t) when j=c.  
Mortensen (2003) gives a detailed derivation of the labour supply curve in terms of 
the separation rate:  )] ( 1 [ { ) ( w F w d
j j - + = l d  of a firm offering wage w has at each 
point in time and the expected number of job offers accepted at each point in time for 
a firm offering wage w :
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We use this alternative notation for the l abour supply curve because we wish to 
distinguish between the separation and offer acceptance rates.  Firms invest in match 
specific human capital T which also costs the firm T.  These sunk costs will be 
incurred every time an offer is accepted.  Human capital enhances the productivity of 
a match according to the concave function  p(T), but the productivity gain of the 
investment is lost as soon as the worker leaves this firm. The cost of the investment T 
is multiplied by the number of matches but is unaffected by the separation rate.  The 
profit function (2) in this case is: 
]
)]} ( 1 [ {
) (
[
























l d l d
ld
l p
                               (14) 
We assume that p(T)=pT
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Substituting (15) into the profit function one obtains: 
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Equation (5) still gives us the value of each firm type and the amended versions of (6) 






l d d l
















)]} ( 1 [ {









- + - - +
-
=
       (17) 









- - + + - - +
-
= w F t w w F p
M
V





                           (18)   12 
One can see by comparing (17) and (18) that in equilibrium at a given wage and value 
of the distribution equation (8) still gives the condition that determines whether a firm 
can profit from moving to the defaulting from the compliant sector or vive-versa.  
Firms below the critical level of employment will default and firms above the critical 
level will comply.  Given that (8) still holds equation (9) continues to give the fraction 
of wage offers in the defaulting sector.  The equilibrium value of firms is given by 
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Next one can equate  k V V
d c = =  to solve for the equilibrium relationship between 
the wage and the wage distribution for both firm types: 
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a  (21) 
One can also solve for the highest wage by setting F=1 in (21). 
We plot the distribution for the same assumed parameter values as in Figure 1 in 
Figure 2 at two different tax rates.  Once again the graph illustrates a wage 
distribution that is consistent with the stylised facts. Low wage small informal firms, 
and large, high wage formal firms.  In this case the inverse wage offer distribution is 
convex, indicating a small amount of weight in the upper tails, which is more in 
keeping with the empirically observed wage distributions.  The higher tax rate 
compresses the wage distribution as in Figure 1. 
 
   13 
II.4 Comparative Statics 
Next we investigate the effect of changes in the policy variables on the 
percentage of workers who will be in the informal sector.  Casual inspection of the 
cut-off value of the wage offer distribution where firms begin complying [equation 
(9)] suggests that the results for a change in the tax rate in particular will not follow 
our intuition. In particular the tax rate does not directly enter equation (9) and the only 
way a change in the tax rate affects the cut-off percentile where firms begin 
complying is through firm exit/entry.  More precisely, it is apparent from (9) that if an 
increase in the tax rate or the punishment/enforcement parameters leads to firm exit 
where lambda is fixed then the fraction of offers from the formal sector will increase.  
One can also see from the formal analysis below that firm exit will occur and, even 
when lambda is variable, that these results will hold for a wide range of parameter 
values. 
While the previous section derives the wage offer distribution, one generally 
observes the wage distribution in the data, i.e., the fraction of workers paid different 
wages or the fraction of workers in the informal sector etc.  We note though that the 
wage distribution is a monotonic transformation of the wage offer distribution. In 
particular Mortensen (2003) shows that the wage distribution G(w) can be written as: 
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From (22) we see that when  l is fixed the sign of the derivative of the wage 
distribution is the same as the sign of derivative of the wage offer distribution. 
Moreover, if l is increasing in the mass of firms  0 <
dz
dM






sgn sgn = so that the comparative static results given for the wage offer 
distribution below will also apply to the wage distribution when  0 <
dz
dM
.  Next we 
define two conditions where elM is the elasticity of  l with respect to the mass of 
firms: 
 
















Appendix one shows that for the exogenous productivity case if lambda is constant, 
condition one is sufficient for  0 <
dz
dM
 and if lambda is increasing in the mass of 




We note that for both the exogenous and endogenous productivity examples in 
the two earlier sections, equation (9) gives us the cut-off value where wage offers are 
from the formal sector.  Initially we will take the case where lambda is fixed.  In this 
case the derivatives of F* with respect to the policy tax rate and 
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= .  In Appendix One we show that this also 
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.  Once again Appendix One 
shows that Condition One is sufficient for this in the exogenous productivity case.  In 
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exogenous productivity case. 
  Next we take the case where l can increase with the mass of firms.  The 
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= .  Since elM<1 ensures that Condition Two is satisfied, this means 
that elM<1 and condition one are sufficient for  0 <
dt
dM
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If we are in the exogenous productivity case elM<1 and Condition One ensure that 











  As we noted earlier one we would not argue that the comparative static results 
here, in particular the result that a higher tax rate reduces the share of the informal 
sector is a general result.  It is nevertheless informative.  If we look at equations (6) 
and (7) we see that the reason the tax rate cancels out in equation (9) is because the 
tax bill enters the costs of complying firms and the punishment of defaulting firms 
linearly.  If the tax rate in (6) had an exponent greater than unity for example, t would 
enter (9) and an increase in the tax rate would directly increase the size of the 
informal sector offsetting the impact of firm exit in increasing the size of this sector.  
We could think of the comparative static results as illustrating that for plausible 
parameter values higher tax and enforcement rates typically cause firm exit which in 
the long run changes the shape of the distribution in a way that increases the share of 
the informal sector.  If there is not a direct affect where the higher tax rate reduces the   17 
share of the informal sector, the impact of firm exit can dominate and the share of the 
informal sector will increase.
15  
Section II: Data 
An important result of our theoretical model is that large firms will operate in 
the formal sector and will pay higher wages than smaller firms, which are predicted to 
conduct business in the informal sector, even when there is no heterogeneity amongst 
either workers or firms ex ante.   To investigate whether there is empirical support for 
these predictions we use the example of South Africa. Our data source is the South 
African Labour Force Survey (SALFSS).  The SALFSS is a twice-yearly rotating 
panel household survey conducted since September 2000, specifically designed to 
measure the dynamics of employment and unemployment in the country.  For our 
analysis we use the waves September 2001, March 2002, September 2002, March 
2003, and September 2003.
16 
In terms of classifying informal sector activity, the SALFSS explicitly asks 
individuals that are employed whether their main activity is in the informal sector.  
More precisely, each employed individual is asked whether ‘the 
organisation/business/enterprise/branch where he/she works is in the formal sector or 
in the informal sector (including domestic work)’.
17  Additionally, there are a number 
of other questions regarding fringe benefits of a job that allow us to further verify the 
individual’s informal sector status.  These include questions regarding whether the 
firm is registered, provides medical aid, deducts unemployment insurance 
contributions, and is registered for VAT.  If an individual answers in the affirmative to 
                                                 
15 In the case of an increase in punishment/enforcement parameter s both the direct and indirect affects 
go in the same direction. 
16 We restrict our analysis to these waves because they allow us to link households over time. 
17 According to the questionnaire, ‘Formal sector employment is where the employer (institution, 
business or private individual) is registered to perform the activity.  Informal sector employment is 
where the employer is not registered’.   18 
any of these questions, we change his/her sector status to being of the formal sector 
even if they classify themselves as working in the informal sector.      
An important feature of our model described above is that of firm size.  In the 
SALFSS employed individuals p rovide explicit information on the size of their 
employer as it falls within six categories: 1  employee, 2 –4 employees, 5 –9 
employees, 10–19 employees, 20-49 employees, 50 or more employees.  We create a 
set of zero-one dummy variables that captures these differences in employer size.   
Since we are specifically interested in the pay differential associated with 
working in the informal sector, an important piece of information required from our 
data is that concerning remuneration.  For those person in paid employment, the 
SALFSS explicitly asks the remuneration in their main activity.  More precisely, the 
SALFSS provides a person’s weekly, monthly, or annual income and hours worked in 
the previous week in their main job, and we use this information to calculate hourly 
wage rates.
18  We converted the hourly wage rate data into real wages (September 
2001 values) by using the South African consumer price deflator.   
An important assumption of our model is that individuals working in the 
informal sector are not subject to taxation. Ideally we would like to take account of 
this, however, it is difficult from simple labour force data, where there is no 
information on non-labour income and where we cannot easily link immediate family 
members within a household, to accurately estimate the amount on labour income that 
is likely to be deducted in terms of taxes for most labour market groups.  In order to be 
able to calculate reasonably accurate net (after taxes) income from employment for 
those working in the formal sector, we thus limit our sample to single men for which 
                                                 
18 For a small subset of individuals, earnings were only recorded as belonging to predefined amount 
categories.   We excluded these from our analysis.   19 
we can relatively easily infer their income tax liabilities for a given annual income.
19  
More precisely, we calculated gross monthly labour income and then used the tax 
tables relevant for that period as published by the South African Revenue Service to 
calculate net monthly income for those working in the formal sector and assumed that 
informal sector workers do not pay taxes on their earnings from employment.
20   
Apart from an explicit definition of the formality of an individual’s employer 
and a precise measure of their remuneration, the SALFSS can also be regarded as 
relatively rich in other information potentially relevant to an individual’s labour 
market status.  We thus compiled information on those factors that are likely to be 
important for determining a person’s pay, as well as whether he/she works in the 
informal sector.  The ones used in the current analysis are grouped for convenience 
sake into those related to human capital (age, gender, race, marital status, education 
level, occupation) and job characteristics like job training, region, tenure, and industry 
(eleven dummies).  We provide a comprehensive list of these and their definitions in 
Table 1. 
An important aspect of the data is its rotating panel nature.  In this regard, it is 
easy to link households across waves when they are re-surveyed since they are given a 
unique household identifier.  In contrast, although individuals are likely also to be 
resurveyed across waves if they remain within the same household, there is no 
straightforward way to link these across waves.  Thus, by pooling all data across 
waves, we would be using multiple observations across at least some individuals in 
our analysis without being able to control for this.   We thus instead, in order to ensure 
that this is not the case, only used information taken from one wave per household, 
arbitrarily chosen as the latest date at which the household was surveyed.    Finally, we 
                                                 
19 One should note that by focusing only on single males allows us also to abstract from the often more 
complex labour force participation decision that is generally associated with females or married males. 
20 Further details are available from the authors.   20 
reduced our sample to non-self employed males, between the ages of 15 and 70, 
working in sectors other than the public sector.  While comparing self-employed 
informal sector to their formal sector counterparts may be of interest in its own right, 
one could argue that the decision of whether to register one’s own enterprise is likely 
to be less constrained or at least determined by different criteria than attempting to get 
a formal sector job, and thus would require a separate analysis which is beyond the 
scope of the current paper.   
Overall our selection criteria left us with a sample of 7,249 single males of 
which 1,427 work in the informal sector.  We provide some simple summary statistics 
of these in Table 2.  As can be seen, formal sector workers earn substantially more 
than their informal sector counterparts in terms of gross log wages, namely about 76 
per cent.  When one allows for the income tax deductions from the earned income for 
those working in the formal sector, this discrepancy is reduced (to about 54 per cent) 
but nevertheless remains.  We also provide the distribution of the formal and informal 
sector workers by the given employer sizes in the same table.  Accordingly, only about 
33 per cent in the formal sector work for firms with less than 10 employees. In 
contrast, in the informal sector the equivalent figure is about 88 per cent.  We also 
calculated the ratio of the formal relative to the informal log wage rate within firm size 
categories in Table 3.  Here it can be seen that in terms of gross wages the relative log 
wage rate differences are largest in the very small and the very large employer size 
categories, while formal sector workers earn between 20 and 35 per cent more in the 
employer size categories that lie between these two.  However, once one allows for tax 
payments for formal sector workers, the discrepancy is reduced in the largest and the 
smallest categories, while it virtually disappears for the intermediate ones, especially 
for those working with employers of size 2-10 workers.   21 
 
III. Econometric Analysis 
  Our simple summary statistics suggested that it is important to take account of 
tax payments by those working in the formal sector when calculating the formal 
sector wage premium as is assumed in our model.  Moreover, comparing wages 
across the formal and informal sector within categories suggested that at least some of 
the difference in total mean wages may be due to the different distributions of 
employer size across the two sectors.  This would be supportive of our theoretical 
result that the formal wage premium may just be due to differences in firm sizes in 
these two sectors.  In order to obtain support for these assertions more formally we 
now proceed to test them econometrically.     
  In terms of measuring the wage premium associated with the informal sector 
one may be tempted to simply run OLS on a standard Mincerian wage equation where 
one regresses logged wages on an indicator of formal sector employment while 
controlling for other relevant and available (as from the data) determinants of 
earnings.  However, as recently shown by Pratap and Quintin (2005), not properly 
taking account of the selection bias in estimating such a parametric regression could 
bias the results.  More specifically, the authors implement a semi-parametric 
propensity score matching estimator that allows one to explicitly deal with the 
problem of common support common in standard OLS, where one may be comparing 
very dissimilar workers.   As a matter of fact under OLS Pratap and Quintin (2005) 
find evidence of a gross wage informal sector premium using Argentinian data, but no 
such earnings differential is detectable under the semi-parametric propensity score 
matching estimator.  We thus similar follow Pratap and Quintin (2005) and resort to 
this semi-parametric approach in investigating the formal sector wage premium.     22 
  Using a similar notation to Pratap and Quintin (2005) we define the average 
formal sector premium as what is in the matching literature known as the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), where treatment refers to employment in the 
formal sector F: 
ATT = E (wage
F | X, sector = F) - E (wage
I | X, sector = F)                (29) 
where X are vector of observed individual and job related characteristics and workers 
i may be employed in the formal sector, i˛F, or in the informal sector, i˛I.  If one 
assumes that the conditional independence assumption holds: 
wage
F, wage
I ^ sector | X                          (30) 
i.e., that selection only occurs in terms of the observed characteristics, then (29) can 
be estimated by
21: 
ATT = E (wage
F | X, sector = F) - E (wage
I | X, sector = I)                           (31) 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 194) have shown that if the conditional independence 
assumption holds then conditioning on propensity scores, defined as 
) | (sec i X F tor P = , is the same as conditioning on the covariates themselves.  One 
can then use these propensity scores to create a sample of `matched’ similar 
individuals, where matching is done via a chosen matching algorithm.  In our case we 
use the caliper method, using a caliper d of size 0.001, although it must be noted that 
we obtained similar results also using nearest neighbor and kernel matching 
methods.
22  More specifically, each formal sector worker is matched with a set of 
informal sector workers whose propensity scores lie within 0.001 of the formal 
worker in question.   
Assuming reasonable matches the ATT is then just: 
                                                 
21 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
22 Details are available from the authors upon request.   23 
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where F
M and  I
M are the sets of matched formal and informal sector employees, 
resepectively that could be matched, N
M is the total number of these, and for all  (i, j) 
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  In order to generate the propensity score to match formal sector workers we 
estimate a probit model of formal sector employment conditional on all characteristics 
as listed in Table 2, alternatively with and without the firm size dummies.  Importantly 
for (33) to be an unbiased estimator of the formal sector wage premium it must be 
emphasized, however, that the conditional independence assumption must hold and, 
thus, that one can argue that the set of covariates  X that we use to generate the 
propensity scores captures all factors that determine both selection into formal sector 
employment and earnings.  While it is not possible for us to test this, given our rich set 
of characteristics we feel reasonably confident that we are indeed likely to be 
satisfying the conditional independence assumption.  
Matching on our set of covariates according to the algorithm above reduced our 
sample in the case with the firm size dummies to 5,563 and for the one without to 
5,587 single men.  To assess our success in matching, we, as suggested by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985), calculated and compared the standardized bias (SB) of the 
propensity scores for our overall and matched sample using:   24 
                                           
( ) ( ) ( ) I F
I F






* 5 . 0
* 100                                (34) 
where  I F p ,  is the average propensity score and  ( ) I F p V ,  its variance for the two 
sectors.  Using this we found that the percentage bias reduction was considerable from 
matching,  around 50 per cent when either including or excluding the firm size 
dummies.  We also, as suggested by Sianesi (2004), compared the pseudo R-squared 
of our matching equation with the pseudo R -squared from re-estimating this on our 
matched sample.  This was found that to be reduced from 0.41 to 0.14 when we did 
not include firm size dummies, and from 0.53 to 0.25 when these were included.  
Thus the matching procedure was able to create a sample for which in terms of our 
explanatory variables much the decision on participation in the formal sector remains 
random. In order to see if the matching can be substantially improved with a more 
restrictive calliper, we also experimented with d = 0.0001. While this further reduced 
the sample by about 16 per cent, there was no noticeable reduction in the bias or in 
lower pseudo r-squared values.   
  Using our matched sample we then proceeded to calculate the ATT as in (31) 
first for the gross hourly wage rate without using firm size dummies in the matching 
procedure, the results of which are given in the first row of Table 4.  Accordingly, the 
earnings premium associated with working in the informal sector is 50.2 per cent and 
statistically significant.  Using net rather than gross wages, as shown in the second 
row, reduces this premium substantially to 35 per cent, but it still remains statistically 
significant.  Matching with the set of our covariates including the firm size dummies 
in the subsequent row, the ATT on gross wages reduces by 7.7 percentage points, but 
again lies within standard significance levels. It is only once we assume that informal 
sector workers do not pay taxes on their wage earnings and use firm size dummies in   25 
our matching  procedure that the wage premium becomes statistically insignificant.  
Thus our results suggest, in congruence with our theoretical framework, that in terms 
of net (of tax) wages, differences in the distribution across employer sizes for 
informal and formal sector workers and the effect of this firm size wage effect can 
account for any observed formal sector wage premium.   
  As a further robustness check we also redid our matching within firm size 
categories and then calculated out the net wage premium associated with working in 
the formal sector in the final six rows of Table 4.  One should note that this meant 
matching on small samples, particularly for the very small and the very large 
categories where there were not many formal and informal sector workers, 
respectively.  Our  results show that even within firm size categories there is no 
significant (net) wage premium.  Thus, once one reduces our sample to more 
homogenous sub-samples in terms of the size of employer there is also no earnings 
premium for working in the formal sector.   
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Theory tells us that, while firm size should not affect wages in a competitive 
labour market, there will be a firm size premium when there are search frictions.  In 
this paper we applied an equilibrium search model to provide a plausible underlying 
rationale for the duality that many economists have observed in developing countries 
between small informal low wage firms and large higher wage formal sector firms. 
Using the South African Labour Force Survey we find empirical evidence supporting 
the hypothesis implied by our model that firm is a key variable in determining the 
formal sector wage premium.  Our model also shows that because of the impact of 
firm exit on the shape of the distribution a higher tax rate can reduce the fraction of   26 
non-compliant workers in long run equilibrium.  Less surprisingly, an increase in 
enforcement or punishment of defaulters is found to reduce the size of the informal 
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Figure 1: Defaulters and compliers inverse wage offer distributions for tax rates 






















































































Notes: For both graphs we assume s=0.2, b=0, p=1, and k=1, and follow Mortensen 
(2003) and assume l=0.287 and d=0.207.  One should note in particular that the 
assumption b=0 simplifies the derivation of  M and causes the equilibrium mass of 
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Figure 2: Defaulters and compliers inverse wage offer distributions for tax rates 











































































































Notes: We make the additional assumption that s=2 for this graph 
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Table 1: List of Explanatory Variables 
 




Real hourly logged wage calculated using a person’s income, hours 







Three dummies related to a person’s race (the population group that 









Two dummies defining the most often spoken l anguage of the 
worker at home 
 
No primary (can not read and 
write), No primary (can read 
and write), Primary, 
Secondary, NTC, University 
 
Six dummies associated to a person’s education level (the highest 





















The period (in years) during which the person was working with the 




Dummy for whether the person owns the tools and/or the equipment 








Classifying the job as a full-time job or part-time job (par-time work 
dummy) 
 
1 worker, 2 -4 workers, 5 -9 
workers, 10-19 workers, 20-49 
workers and = 50 workers 
 




Eleven dummies for the industry variables  (eleventh industry dummy 
‘Exterior organizations and foreign government’ is omitted) 
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Table 2: General Summary Statistics 
 
    Formal  Informal 
log(Gross Wage)  Mean  1.39  0.79 
log(Net Wage)  Mean  1.22  0.79 
1 employee  % of total  0.03  0.49 
2-4 employees  % of total  0.11  0.38 
5-9 employees  % of total  0.19  0.11 
10-19 employees  % of total  0.18  0.06 
20-49 employees  % of total  0.19  0.03 
50+ employees  % of total  0.25  0.01 
 
 
Table 3: Ratio of the Formal Relative to the Informal log Wage Rate by 
Employer Size 
 
Firm Size  log(Gross Wage) Ratio  log(Net Wage) Ratio 
1 employee  1.66  1.38 
2-4 employees  1.28  1.07 
5-9 employees  1.21  1.05 
10-19 employees  1.34  1.17 
20-49 employees  1.34  1.17 
50+ employees  1.92  1.71 
 
 
Table 4: Estimate of ATT of the Formal Sector Wage Premium 
 
Sample  Wage  Firm Size DVs  
Included 
ATT  Standard 
Error 
Matched Sample 
Total  Gross  No  0.502**  0.057  5587 
Total  Net  No  0.350**  0.055  5587 
Total  Gross  Yes  0.423*  0.186  5563 
Total  Net  Yes  0.241  0.157  5563 
1 employees  Net  ---  0.010  0.228  126 
2-4 employees  Net  ---  0.010  0.103  451 
5-9 employees  Net  ---  -0.006  0.157  367 
10-19 employees  Net  ---  -0.079  0.156  449 
20-49 employees  Net  ---  0.020  0.244  366 
50+ employees  Net  ---  0.299  0.515  51 
Notes: (1) ** and * stand for one and five per cent significance levels, respectively.  
(2) Standard errors generated via boostrapping using 500 replications.  (3) Matching 
done separately for individual firm size categories. 
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Appendix One: The Impact of a Change in t or s on the Mass of Firms 
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    (A.1.1) 
The first line constitutes the change in fixed entry costs from a change in the mass of 
firms, the second term is the direct impact of a change in the mass of firms, the third 
line is the derivative from a change in offer arrival rates resulting from a change in 
firm entry, and the fourth line provides the derivative with respect to a change in the 
tax rate t.  One should note that if one totally differentiates (13) with respect to the 
punishment/enforcement rate s and M one would get the same expression as (16) 
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s .  Substituting the right hand side in for s in (A.1.3) we s ee that a 
sufficient condition for this expression to be positive is: 
Condition One:  ) 1 ( t b p s + >   
Next one can say that if Condition One holds then  0 <
dt
dM

















While Condition Two may not hold, for reasonable parameter values the indication is 
that it will hold unless e?M  is very large. For example if ?>d Condition Two certainly 
holds, or, taking the values ?=0.207 and d=0.287 used by Mortensen (2003) in his 
simulations, Condition Two will hold as long as e?M<6.17.  One should also note that 
this is a sufficient condition, so there is a range of parameter values where Conditions 
One or Two fail but  0 <
dt
dM
continues too hold.  We also remark that in the simpler 
case where ? is not dependent on the mass of firms Condition Two always holds so 
that Condition One is sufficient for  0 <
dt
dM
. 